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Introduction 
It is not uncommon in today’s post sub-prime crisis era for staunch supporters 
of private banking to now admit that state-owned banks once played an 
important role in the post war period by ‘filling market gaps’. Yet such 
admissions are then quickly qualified by claims that state-owned banks 
remain inefficient and ineffective in practice today (World Bank 2012a, 101). 
Yet state-like banking long preceded the post-war period and arguments that 
state-owned banks simply filled private banking gaps oversimplifies the 
historical circumstances and exaggerates the actual capacity of the private 
sector, thus distorting a diversity of circumstances. Indeed, some of the 
earliest public banks emerged in response not to market gaps but to private 
banking profligacy. In Medieval times the punitive consequences of debt 
default created periodic social instability, leading public officials to 
occasionally offer debt relief. Two early European state banks emerged in 
response to this: one in Barcelona in 1401 (which survived more than 450 
years) and a second in 15th century Genoa (which came to be known as the 
Bank of Venice and functioned for over two centuries (Brown 2013, 100-3). 
Later examples include 18th century Quaker farmers in Pennsylvania, who 
founded a Land Bank to collectively contribute to the development of their 
community (and to push back against usurious British bankers) (Rappaport 
1996).  
To be sure, it was not until capitalist industrialization took root globally 
in the late 19th and early 20th century that state banking became firmly 
established in capitalist and socialist countries alike. National governments 
recognized that state-owned banks provided the only option for overcoming 
the limitations of private banking and, in many cases, countering the power of 
imperial bankers. The Ottoman government’s creation of an agricultural fund 
in 1863 to support farmers (which evolved into modern Turkey’s Ziraat Bank) 
is such an example, as the nascent bank also served to ease European debt 
dependency in the early 20th century (Marois and Güngen 2013). Through the 
20th Century other socialist, social democratic, and even militaristic countries 
experimented with state banking. Amidst its brief 1948 revolutionary period 
Costa Rican officials nationalized the banks to promote the ‘democratization 
of credit’ and national development. The post-1949 Revolutionary Communist 
Party of China restructured the People’s Bank as a single, large state bank 
geared to managing economic and political transformation under communism. 
Following the country’s 1961 coup, South Korean military leaders nationalized 
the banks and then reoriented them towards national developmental goals 
(Erdogdu 2004, 265). In India, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi nationalized 14 
large private banks in 1969 ostensibly to facilitate a socialist-oriented 
developmental policy. Many more bank nationalizations occurred in countries 
as diverse as Algeria, Egypt, Libya, and Tanzania in the 1960s. 
This diverse post war history of state banking suggests complex logics 
at work – from creating banking services where none existed, to countering 
colonial and foreign monetary dominance, to pursuing hopes of 
democratization and development, to supporting militaristic goals. By the 
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1970s, estimates suggest that in advanced economies state banks controlled 
40 per cent of the largest banks’ combined assets and 65 per cent in 
developing economies (Levy Yeyati et al. 2007, 212). Only in the most 
creative ways could it be upheld that these varied and widespread instances 
of state-owned banking all succumb to simply filling in where private banks 
ought to have been. 
Thirty years of neoliberal restructuring have nonetheless sidelined most 
alternative logics and practices to the complete private provisioning of banking 
and finance for development. A number of mainstream myths about state-
owned banks have helped to stoke and sustain the neoliberal maxim that 
whatever the problem, private sectors solutions and market processes are 
society’s best hope of resolving it effectively and efficiently. In what follows, I 
dispell eight additional myths common to neoliberal finance and 
developmental discourses today. The argument guiding this review is that 
there are sufficient counter examples and progressive narratives around 
actually existing state-owned banks to demand a systematic rethink from 
conventional economists and international financial institutions (IFIs). State-
owned banks can form a crucial part of progressive, sustainable, and 
democratic strategies for long-term social development goals. In undertaking 
this task I would like to caution the reader that this argument is not intended to 
suggest, simplistically, that public or state bank ownership, in and of itself, is 
necessarily and innately any alternative. Rather, public ownership offers a 
potentially rich institutional vessel whose social content can more readily be 
defined by progressive, social developmental, and collective aspirations than 
private corporatized ownership. That is, there is latent political potential that 
can only be realised by the society in which a public bank exists. 
 
Myth One: There are no state-owned banks left 
It is a popular misconception that state-owned banks have disappeared under 
neoliberalism. To be sure, neoliberal structural adjustment and privatization 
processes have led to a reduction in state banking assets globally. The World 
Bank estimates that in emerging economies state bank ownership has fallen 
from 67 per cent in 1970 to 22 per cent in 2009 (2012a, 103). Patterns have 
varied, nonetheless. In Costa Rica, whereas in the mid-1990s more than 80 
per cent of banking assets were state-owned, by 2001 it had dropped closer 
to 63 per cent. The Mexican banking sector went from completely public after 
nationalization in 1982 to fully private after 1992. Poland, too, privatized much 
of its state bank claim, which fell from 80 per cent in 1990 to roughly 23 per 
cent in 2001.  
In times of crisis, however, the trend sometimes reverses as state 
authorities step in to rescue failed private banks via nationalization. Some 
examples include Sweden in 1992, Mexico in 1994-95, Latvia in 1995-96, 
East Asia in 1997, and Argentina in 2001. Following the 2008 financial crisis, 
state bank ownership among developed economies increased from 6.7 per 
cent pre-2008 to 8 per cent overall (World Bank 2012a, 103). Individual cases 
are more dramatic with Ireland jumping from 0 to 21 per cent and the UK from 
1 to 26 per cent from 2008 to 2010.  
Nevertheless in many more countries state bank assets remain 
significant. Table 1 provides data on a selection of countries from a World 
Bank survey on “government controlled banks,” defined as those in which 
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government exercises control through ownership of more than 50 per cent of 
voting shares, or other forms of control. 
 
Table 1: State-owned banking assets, select countries, percentage of 
total, 2008 to 2010 
 
  ARGENTINA 
BANGLAD
ESH BRAZIL BURUNDI 
ECUADO
R 
2008 37.7% 37.8% 39.8% 49.1% 11.77% 
2009 39.1% 35.2% 44.1% 48.1% 16.18% 
2010 43.6% 34.1% 43.5% 48.9% 16.53% 
 EGYPT GERMANY INDIA 
INDONESI
A 
KOREA, 
REPUBLI
C OF 
2008 49.30% 35.44% 69.85% 38.20% 22.20% 
2009 48.50% 36.08% 71.88% 39.70% 22.40% 
2010 --- 31.52% 73.70% 38.41% 22.30% 
 KYRGYZSTAN LATVIA POLAND 
PORTUGA
L 
RUSSIAN 
FEDERATI
ON 
2008 17.50% 10.50% 17.00% 21.04% 38.00% 
2009 81.00% 17.10% 21.00% 21.73% 40.60% 
2010 20.30% 15.50% 22.00% 22.64% 40.80% 
 SIERRA LEONE 
SRI 
LANKA 
THAILAN
D TURKEY 
VENEZUE
LA 
2008 41.49% 55.50% 22.20% 30.50% 11.90% 
2009 38.62% 57.80% 21.70% 32.20% 22.01% 
2010 37.71% 59.10% 17.50% 31.60% 33.06% 
Source: World Bank 2012a. 
 
It is also true that many of the largest and best-run banks remain in 
state hands (see Micco et al. 2004, 9). But this has led to mainstream 
criticisms that governments hold on to the biggest and best banks for 
nefarious purposes (Boubakri et al. 2005). Neoliberals argue that these large 
state-owned banks thus become a drag on the economy and hotbeds of 
political corruption. By contrast, others see these remaining public institutions 
as offering an important material basis and institutionalized form of social 
power that needs to be defended and improved (Lapavitsas 2010; Culpeper 
2012). The Inter-American Development Bank, for example, recently authored 
a report highlighting the need for crafting a new paradigm around public 
banking, one that adequately accounts for their social developmental 
successes (IDB 2013). 
 
Myth Two: Better to regulate private banks than own state banks 
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Notwithstanding renewed interest in state banking, neoclassical economists 
and neoliberal advocates see private ownership as innately superior to state 
ownership (Hayek 1984; Shleifer 1998; Vanberg 2005). In the field of banking 
and finance this ideological framework tied to the efficient market hypothesis 
is represented by the so-called ‘private’ or ‘political’ interest view, which took 
root starting in the late 1970s. Advocates argue that the attribution of any 
progressive public ethos to state ownership is both idealistic and naïve (Barth 
et al. 2006, 34-5; cf. La Porta et al. 2002). In IFI circles, these dominant 
private interest viewpoints translate into policy arguments that suggest it is 
better to regulate private banks than to own public banks (World Bank 2012a, 
3). Rather than replacing markets, government regulation should support 
market actors and market discipline as the best guarantor of socially desirable 
results (Barth et al. 2006, 14;). In World Bank speak, policymakers should 
work with markets “to align private incentives with public interest” (2001, ix). 
More than three decades of neoliberal developmentalism have yet to 
really substantiate mainstream hopes that private regulation is sufficient for 
economic growth, stability, and social equity. Notably, bank privatization and 
financial liberalization processes have left major gaps in the financing of 
development and public services – from water to health to electricity 
generation to agriculture (see Bayliss and Adam 2012, 330; Davis 2008; Fine 
and Hall 2012, 64-65; Hathaway 2012, 356; McDonald and Ruiters 2012; 
Sengupta 2012, 195). Private market-based finance often baulks at funding 
long-term, complicated projects or imposes conditions on their loans that 
protect their interests over and above that of the project’s viability and 
sustainability, not to mention the public good. There remains great need for 
financing that comes without neoliberal and profit-maximizing conditionalities, 
but rather is subordinated to public service delivery and social developmental 
needs (Balanyá et al. 2005; Fine and Hall 2012, 46; Malaluan 2012, 258).  
The shortcomings of such neoliberal idealism vis-à-vis hopeful 
regulation of private incentives is perhaps most evident with mainstream 
responses to the global financial crisis (e.g. Acemoglu 2009; Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Servén 2010; Mishkin 2009). As even the Financial Times recognizes, 
attempts to re-regulate private banking and finance following the US sub-
prime and global crisis debacle have failed miserably, leading to larger and 
more systemically powerful banks, thus creating “an insane financial system” 
(Tett 2013). Even World Bank economists have had to admit that state banks 
can serve an important countercyclical lending role during times of crisis 
(without, however, foregoing their long-term preferences for complete private 
ownership of banks) (Bertay et al. 2014). Regulation alone in those countries 
hardest hit by the crisis, like the UK, has largely failed to stimulate economic 
recovery (Macartney 2014). 
Notwithstanding conventional economists’ and IFI attempts at 
containment, the recent global crisis has revived deep interest in state-owned 
banking across the academic spectrum and among some development 
institutions (see Blackburn 2011; Brown 2013; Buiter 2009; Butzbach 2012; 
Culpeper 2012; Lapavitsas 2010; Marshall 2010; OECD/ECLAC 2012; 
Veltmeyer 2010; IDB 2013). What these authors share, however diverse their 
analyses, is a realistic appreciation that private finance always finds ways to 
supersede regulatory barriers in pursuit of their own interests of profit 
maximization. Current circumstances and equitable developmental 
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aspirations, however, will likely require direct government ownership as a 
necessary, if not sufficient, condition for viable finance for development 
alternatives. 
 
Myth Three: Evidence shows that private banks are better   
Bank privatization initiatives are most often shaped by neoclassical research 
methodologies that claim to provide solid, evidence-based support for policy 
decisions (Barth et al. 2006; World Bank 2012a, xiii). Large-scale samples 
seeking statistically relevant correlations are often the most influential (see 
Megginson 2005, 316). One such influential study compared ownership of the 
largest banks in the 1960s and 1970s to that in 1995, across 92 different 
countries (La Porta et al. 2002). The authors concluded that state-owned 
banking correlates with countries that are not only “inefficient” and “less 
democratic” but also “backward,” “poorer,” “statist” and “financially 
underdeveloped.” A series of follow-up empirical studies have extended these 
findings, each recommending bank privatization as the preferred policy 
(Boehmer et al. 2005; Boubakri et al. 2005, 2008; Otchere 2005).  
In doing so, however, neoclassical researchers have failed to respond to a 
wide array of methodological criticisms that question their underlying 
assumptions that markets are neutral, their narrow focus on property rights, 
and their ahistorical perspectives (Ankarloo 2002; Hodgson 1986, 213). 
Critical scholars contend that neoclassical deductive approaches begin by 
presuming the answer, namely, that state banks are inherently inferior to 
private banks. Conventional researchers then magnify the original problem by 
imposing private banking assessment criteria, namely efficiency cum 
profitability maximization, onto state banking operations without due 
consideration for wider historical, social, economic, or political realities. 
Finally, skeptics of conventional claims of evidence suggest that such large-
scale empirical studies draw together countries with radically different 
histories, systematically hiding more about state banking than the studies can 
possibly reveal (Stallings 2006). The evidence of private bank superiority, 
thus, needs to be read cautiously. A recent report on public banks in Europe 
puts it succinctly (Schmit et al. 2011, 104): 
 
This wide range of underlying economic rationales [of public financial 
institutions in Europe] renders meaningless most performance-based 
analyses of public sector banks, since all that such analyses measure 
is financial performance (which presupposes the overriding aim of profit 
maximisation), neglecting all other kinds of objectives pursued by 
public financial institutions.  
 
A close reading of the pro-bank privatization literature reveals, too, that 
neoclassical researchers are often disingenuous about the limits of their 
evidence. While claiming that their policy prescriptions are not intended as 
‘one size fits all’, state bank ownership is ruled out a priori as an unviable 
long-term policy option (Barth et al. 2006, 5; World Bank 2001, 29). Despite 
acknowledging country specificity, only market-enhancing and private 
property protecting reforms are viable (Demirgüç-Kunt and Servén 2010; 
Mishkin 2009). As von Mettenheim writes, neoclassicals “fail to consider how 
government banks may succeed, as banks, as agents of public policy and as 
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essential parts of political and social economies” (2010, 15). What it boils 
down to is that neoclassical economists “approach the analysis of social 
reality armed with inappropriate tools” (Lawson 2013, 972), leading to 
ideologically charged and distorted policy recommendations based on 
empirical evidence that fits their predetermined agenda. In other words, a 
neoclassical evidentiary basis alone is not a reliable foundation upon which to 
build informed banking sector policy. 
Instead, a genuinely historical research program should seek to 
understand specific local differences within an analytical framework capable 
of recognizing wider global development structures and financial processes 
(see for example the ‘variegated capitalism’ approach of Peck and Theodore 
2007). This can be achieved through strategies of inquiry that are qualitative 
and case study-oriented, which experts on methodology suggest are best able 
to generate original evidence-based policy recommendations (see Creswell 
2009; Mabry 2008). Case study research also helps to reveal power 
structures, social imbalances, and their effects – concerns that have become 
increasingly important with the growing influence of private financial 
institutions today. Finally, the pre-social foundations of the private interest 
view of banking should be supplanted by a social content view of banking. 
Such an approach would seek to provide a more nuanced understanding of 
the socio-historical forces impacting state banks (cf. Hilferding 2006 [1981]; 
Marois 2015, 33-4). This entails resisting any temptation to elevate bank 
ownership, public or private, to a place of functional determinacy outside of 
historical and social change. Banks can be interpreted as “institutionalized 
social relations that reflect historically specific relations of power and 
reproduction between the banks, other firms, the state, and labor in general” 
(Marois 2012, 29). Evidence generated in this way is often far more case 
sensitive and open to historical (as opposed to transhistorical) determinations. 
 
Myth Four: State banks only lend to their cronies 
State-owned banks often have a reputation for only lending money to big 
businesses friendly to government, with East Asia being frequently cited as an 
illustration of why state banks might not work (Bird and Milne 1999; Lim 2012; 
Woo 1991). It is true that tight state-industrial group relations (so-called crony 
capitalism) contributed to the private sector amassing huge state bank loans 
that partially contributed to the 1997-98 East Asian crisis and subsequent 
public losses. Yet the problem of crony lending in East Asia (and elsewhere) 
has not been limited to state-owned banks (and, indeed, neoliberal financial 
liberalization demands can contribute to the problems state banks suffer 
(Erdogdu 2004, 272-3). Private banks in developing countries regularly lend to 
big businesses related to their own interests and accumulation strategies 
(Marois 2012, 11; 150).  
It is nevertheless a powerful myth that state-owned banks are the real 
or only culprits in this regard, regularly reproduced in mainstream media. 
Taking aim at China, for example, The Economist quotes a young Chinese 
businessperson saying that the “[public] banks here only give money to big 
companies” (The Economist 2012). In reality, the Chinese state-owned banks 
do much more. In 2010, China’s state-owned banks offered 316,000 loans to 
small rural start-ups equalling RMB 14.14 billion (roughly $2.3 billion) with 
plans to extend such loans to urban centres (CBRC 2010, 49). These loans 
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are facilitated by thousands of smaller city and rural commercial state banks 
and rural financial institutions (which equalled about 20 per cent of all assets 
in 2010) that have a client base extending well beyond big business (CBRC 
2010, 26). Furthermore, such anecdotal assertions are often intended to 
simply undermine state bank credibility. As Yeung (2014) suggests, Chinese 
state banks lend more to Chinese state enterprises because the risks are 
fewer and the likelihood of repayment greater than lending to unsecured and 
risky private enterprises, which would put the banks’ capital at greater risk. 
This wider pattern of lending is not limited to China either. As Table 2 
illustrates, state-owned development banks – old and new, from large 
advanced and small developing economies alike – are mandated to lend to 
many different sectors, including agriculture, construction, public services, 
energy, education, health, SMEs, municipalities, infrastructure, and so on. 
These lending practices are not perfect by any means, and mandates can and 
do diverge from actual lending practices in problematic ways. One of the great 
challenges of public banking is to better institutionalize transparency and 
accountability. Further research is required in this area to better inform public 
banking policy and practice (as opposed to calls for privatization, which 
resolves nothing). 
 
Table 2: Selected development banks and mandates 
Development 
bank (100% 
state-owned) 
 
Mission 
 
Sub-sectors 
granted credits 
 
Government-
backed 
lending? 
 
Fiji 
Development 
Bank (FDB) 
(1967) 
 
To provide finance for 
projects that contribute to 
the development of the Fiji 
economy and improve the 
quality of life for the 
people of Fiji. Loan funds 
are provided for 
agricultural, small and 
medium enterprises, 
corporate and micro 
projects. The government 
also uses the FDB, as a 
financial instrument in its 
development 
projects/plans and special 
assistance programs that 
may be necessary from 
time to time. 
 
Agriculture; 
construction; 
industry; 
services; mining 
infrastructure; 
energy; 
education; 
health. 
 
Yes 
 
North Rhine-
Westphalia 
(NRW Bank, 
Germany) 
(2004) 
 
To support the federal 
state and its municipal 
corporations in meeting 
their public tasks, 
particularly in the fields of 
structural, economic, 
Agriculture; 
construction; 
services; mining 
infrastructure; 
other. 
Yes 
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social and housing policy. 
 
Uganda 
Development 
Bank Limited 
(1972) 
  
 
Development finance 
institution; to provide 
financial support to short, 
medium and long term 
projects geared toward 
economic development of 
the nation. 
 
Agriculture; 
construction; 
industry; 
services; mining 
infrastructure; 
energy; 
education; 
health; other. 
 
Yes 
Vietnam Bank 
for Social 
Policies 
(1996) 
  
 
To help reduce the 
poverty rate and improve 
theenvironmental situation 
in Vietnam. 
 
Agriculture; 
construction; 
industry; energy; 
education; other. 
 
Yes 
Bank of 
Public Works 
and Services, 
National 
Society of 
Credit 
(Mexico, 
1933) 
 
 
To finance or refinance 
public or private 
investment projects in 
infrastructure and public 
services such that it aids 
in the institutional 
strengthening of the 
federal, state, and 
municipal governments. 
 
Services; 
infrastructure; 
other. 
 
Yes 
Source: World Bank 2012b. 
 
Myth Five: Bureaucrats make bad bankers 
According to conventional neoclassical economists state-owned banks are 
run by bureaucrats who pursue personal and political gain, leading to sub-
optimal performance (World Bank 2001, 123; also see Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Servén 2010, 98-99). This neoclassical/neoliberal myth is problematic not just 
because of its universal and ahistorical scope. It is also problematic because 
it simplistically assumes that in all real world cases state ownership confers 
unmediated control over state banks to (inherently corrupt) bureaucrats that 
are active in bank management. Needless to say, the absolutism of such 
claims is belied by the paucity of substantiating evidence. Of course, 
correlations around lending patterns and elections can be made, though 
causation remains another matter (Dinç 2005). Yet even World Bank 
acknowledges weaknesses in its own knowledge base, recently stating that in 
fact “little is known” about state banks’ actual operations, mandates, services, 
clientele, regulatory and governance frameworks, and challenges (de Luna-
Martinez and Vicente 2012, 2). Evidence on this matter has had little to do 
with promoting aggressive bank privatization. As late as 2001, the World Bank 
acknowledged that “the primary evidence on this issue [government failure in 
finance] has been anecdotal” (2001, 127).  
This myth erases real world diversity in banking operations and 
governance structures, distorting the actual functioning of state-owned banks 
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in different places and at different times. Neoliberal assumptions ignore the 
multifaceted day in and day out work and agency of hundreds of thousands of 
frontline bank workers, mid-level supervisors, branch and regional managers, 
and senior executives in addition to the many mid-level bureaucrats serving in 
financial authorities (bank regulators and supervisors, central banks, 
treasuries, and so on). We are expected to believe in some abstract, all-
powerful, and resolutely self-interested universal ‘bureaucrat’ when state 
banks are institutions run by diverse people, individually and collectively. 
Particular bureaucrats may have power over certain banks or they may not. 
When bureaucrats do have institutionalized control, they may or may not 
exercise it, with positive or negative or neutral effects. Regardless, all policy 
decisions are implemented, and therefore mediated, by bank workers and 
managers who may support or resist certain directives. Moreover, this 
worldview sidesteps the ongoing neoliberal restructuring of state-owned 
banks that instils the very market-oriented ideology so dear to neoliberals – 
notably, corporatization and marketization. A few examples help to illustrate 
the diversity obscured by neoclassical mythology. 
 
The State Bank of India: Corporatized but social developmental 
The State Bank of India (SBI) is India’s oldest and largest bank controlling 
roughly 20 per cent of the banking sector (Chakrabarti 2012, 250-252). Its 
operations are nationwide, with over 21,500 branches in 2009. In 2005 about 
a third of all bank employees in the country worked for the SBI. The 
government retains overall control but with a diversified Board of Directors. 
For example, the Board includes two government-appointed bank workers 
and management directors in addition to directors appointed because of their 
specialized expertise in cooperative institutions, rural economy, commerce 
and finance. At the same time the SBI must contend with the demands of a 
highly organized and militant bank workers’ movement, whose million-person 
strikes and multi-day walkouts can shut down the banking sector. Market-
oriented restructuring since the 1990s, moreover, has meant the Board must 
respond to a dual mandate: (a) ‘profit-maximizing’ for the shareholders; and 
(b) government developmental directives (e.g. offering rural financial services 
and financing fiscal policy) (Chakrabarti 2012, 253). Control over the SBI is 
thus both corporatized and social developmental in orientation. 
 
The Development Bank of South Africa: Independent but neoliberal 
The Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA) is a fully state-owned 
development bank (Beck et al. 2011, 153). Established in 1983 amidst the 
global neoliberal turn, the government mandated the DBSA to promote 
economic development and growth (World Bank 2012b). The DBSA began 
working closely with the World Bank in the mid-1990s and was staffed by a 
neoliberal technocratic wing of the government (Bond 2000). The Board and 
management personnel are formally independent and while the Treasury 
takes an active shareholder role it, too, is neoliberal in orientation. Presently 
the DBSA manages assets in excess of $6 billion, realizes returns on assets 
(ROA) of two to four per cent, and is involved in financing infrastructure, 
agriculture, construction, industry, energy, education, and health alongside 
providing technical assistance and grants to low-income municipalities. As 
such, the DBSA does not seem to confirm neoclassical myths about 
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bureaucrats being bad bankers. Rather, it appears to have good neoliberal 
bureaucrats – if not good progressive alternative bankers – to the extent that 
the World Bank cites the DBSA’s governance structure as a model of success 
(Beck et al 2011, 153). 
 
European savings banks: Small but socially responsible 
As a non-homogenous type of bank, European savings banks are typically 
small-scale decentralized public banks often created by local governments or 
organizations; that is, they are not owned by central governments unlike most 
of the state banks discussed here (Butzbach 2012, 36-7). The savings banks 
are interesting because of their often alternative ownership and control 
models, which mandate them to perform in a broadly defined public interest. 
On the one hand, the banks integrate local stakeholders, employees, 
government officials, and depositors into their governance decisions and 
certain profit imperatives to ensure operational sustainability. On the other 
hand, the banks pursue not-for-profit public mandates (von Mettenheim 2012, 
18). For example, the French savings banks must dedicate half of their 
returns to social responsibility programs, which are managed by bank staff 
alongside social and political representatives. Spanish savings banks are 
mandated to contribute on average about a quarter of their returns to social 
welfare programs. While relatively small-scale, the savings banks illustrate 
important alternative governance practices that internalize explicit social 
mandates and community integration often missing in larger state-owned 
banks. In this case, bureaucrats and public officials can do well offering 
socially oriented banking services. Yet at the same time it is important to 
recognize the influence neoliberal competitive imperatives can have on these 
institutions, compelling otherwise socially progressive orientations to conform 
more closely to commercialized ones, as in the case of Spain (Ysa et al. 
2012). 
 
The Banco Popular (Costa Rica): Collectively run and socially 
responsible 
Our final example is not a state-owned bank (although three large state-
owned banks exist in Costa Rica). Rather, the Banco Popular is a public bank 
that is worker-owned and controlled.1 Uniquely, the bank’s collective 
‘Assembly of Workers of the Popular Bank and Communal Development’ 
governs its operations and ensures that the bank’s missions to protect the 
economic welfare of workers and to promote development are met. The 
ownership and control framework is inclusive. A participatory model of 
decision-making is facilitated through workshops for national delegates. This 
collective model has allowed for important extra-market targets. For example, 
the Banco Popular embodies explicit gender equity norms, which are 
protected by the Permanent Women’s Commission. The Banco Popular 
workers’ assembly has also ensured the bank is profitable and stable. In 2012 
the BP earned $74 million and boasted a triple-A rating from Fitch. In doing so 
the BP anticipated providing about $820 million in consumer and development 
credits in 2013 – which is significant for this small country. While not a state-																																																								
1 The following comes from the Banco Popular website, including its audited financial 
statements and president’s directives; see https://www.popularenlinea.fi.cr/bpop/. 
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owned bank the public BP offers important governance lessons for 
participatory, democratized, alternative forms of financing for development. 
 
These brief case examples demonstrate that the social content of state-
owned banks can vary, shaped as it is by historically specific 
institutionalizations of power and class that differ according to place 
specificities and in the context of global capitalism – not the timeless and 
invariably ‘bad bureaucrat banker’ myth suggested by neoclassical theory. 
There is great real world diversity in cases of state bank ownership and 
control, and evidence-based policy-making should not presume particular 
outcomes based on pre-social neoclassical economics ideology. 
 
Myth Six: Small is beautiful  
International financial and development institutions, together with many 
governments, have embraced microfinance schemes as a new form of 
financial access and inclusion seemingly able to release virtuous cycles of 
individual entrepreneurial drive and developmental forces (World Bank 2013). 
Framed in this way microfinance fits well with neoliberal developmental 
strategies. The World Bank champions it because it leaves credit assessment 
and allocative decisions to the private sector. The only (explicit) role 
suggested for the state is to enable these new credit markets through better 
regulation and supervision.  
For many scholars, however, the benefits of microfinance have been 
grossly oversold and misrepresented. Not only do microcredit schemes fail to 
offer a silver bullet for development but its various disciplinary 
creditworthiness mechanisms create new community and gendered debt 
problems (see Bateman 2010; Duffy-Tumasz 2009; MacLean 2012). 
Microfinance often embeds and deepens pre-existing unequal social relations 
of gender, power and class between financial capital and the poor, workers 
and peasantry (Soederberg 2013; Weber 2004).  
 Viable state-owned banking alternatives for small-scale lending exist, 
which provide financial access without the highly exploitative practices of 
microfinance institutions (such as China’s rural financial institutions). As a 
Bank for International Settlements report acknowledges, in emerging markets 
as diverse as Argentina, Brazil, Russia and Thailand only the “state-owned 
banks are willing to serve customers in remote areas” (Hawkins and Mihaljek 
2001, 15). Case study research supports this claim. In Brazil state-owned 
banks like the Caixa Economica Federal have taken a lead in increasing 
access for the underbanked in rural and remote areas, while simultaneously 
providing innovative social supports for the poor (von Mettenheim 2014, 190-
1). In China, financial authorities have encouraged state-owned small and 
medium-sized rural financial institutions to extend access across the country, 
prioritizing villages and towns (CBRC 2010, 47-8). In Turkey the state-owned 
agricultural bank, Ziraat, has been present in small towns and rural villages for 
decades and the state-owned Halk (People’s) Bank has long serviced 
tradespersons, cooperatives, and today’s SMEs (Marois and Güngen 2013). 
Likewise, state-owned post office banks, which accept deposits but provide 
fairly basic financial services, can help offer financial services without the 
problems associated with microfinance schemes. They provide accessible 
money transfer services, a safe haven for savings, and banks that can help 
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fund fiscal policy. Examples exist in Benin, Burkina Faso, Gabon, Mauritius, 
Tanzania and South Africa, including a new state-owned postal bank that 
opened in the spring of 2013 in the Congo (Africa Research Bulletin 2013). 
Even advanced economies such as the UK and New Zealand have set up 
postal banks to help deliver banking services to the poor and to rural areas 
(Hawkins and Mihaljek 2001, 15). Given that a recent UK Department for 
International Development systematic review concludes that the popular 
evidence claims of microfinance achievements are built of foundations of sand 
(Duvendack et al. 2011, 75), there is an urgent need to research other 
actually existing and viable public sector banking alternatives for financial 
inclusion. 
 
Myth Seven: State-owned banks put public revenues at risk 
 
Banks have proved themselves to be the most hazardous economic 
institutions known to man… It is tempting to conclude that banks 
should simply be abolished. Unfortunately, that is unlikely to be 
possible. Banks seem to be necessary. (The Economist, May 1, 2003) 
 
All banking activity involves risk of monetary loss since it usually implies 
lending now in order to be repaid later with interest. This is true for both state 
and private banks. However, under neoliberalism, an uneven process 
characterized by the increasing centralization and concentration of banking 
capital, private banking institutions have become larger and much more 
volatile. And now when crises strike the risks tend to be paid for (read: 
socialized) with the public purse: “a now generalized process by which state 
authorities diffuse the worst and most costly financial risks onto workers in 
society through the state apparatus” (Marois 2014, 309).  
While state-owned banks can put public revenues at risk, so too do 
private banks but at far greater magnitude (the 2008-09 global crisis comes to 
mind). An IMF report that preceded the sub-prime crisis lists many dozens of 
systemic banking crises since the 1970s. Some of these crises involved state-
owned banks including, but not limited to, India in 1993, Costa Rica in 1994, 
Vietnam in 1997, and China in 1998 (Laeven and Valencia 2008, 32-49). 
Brazil and Turkey also experienced banking crises that implicated their state-
owned banks (Marois 2011; von Mettenheim 2010). The 2008 IMF report 
emphasizes that state-owned banks are “common in crisis countries, with the 
government owning about 31 per cent of banking assets on average” (while 
failing to underscore that the other 69 per cent are, of course, private assets) 
(Laeven and Valencia 2008, 19). The report also downplays that the 
frequency of banking crises has increased dramatically with neoliberal 
restructuring and privatization: from 1970 to 1980 there were four banking 
crises worldwide, but this increased to 120 from 1980 to 2007 (excluding the 
current crisis and ongoing instability) (Laeven and Valencia 2008, 56). These 
crises, due disproportionately to private banking, cost the public purse on 
average 13.3 per cent of GDP to resolve, with authorities, on average, only 
recovering 18.2 per cent of the socialized costs (Laeven and Valencia 2008, 
24). State banks are not without risk, but it is private banking in general and 
its aggressive profit orientation that are the real threats in a neoliberal era. 
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 As suggested, the US sub-prime crisis and global financial meltdown is 
a case in point (McNally 2011). Some estimates put the overall cost of the 
crisis, including lost output, at nearly $13 trillion (Khimm 2012). The hardest 
hit countries are the advanced economies of the US and UK (followed by 
Iceland and then Italy, Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain), which are 
dominated by private banks. Robin Blackburn (2011, 35) writes: 
 
The banks’ heedless pursuit of short-term advantage led to the largest 
destruction of value in world history during the Crash of 2008. 
Government rescue measures were to offer unlimited liquidity to the 
financial sector, while leaving the system largely intact. 
 
Even the Governor of the Bank of England, Mervyn King, was to recognize 
this in a 2011 address to British MPs, “[t]he price of this financial crisis is 
being borne by people who absolutely did not cause it” (Inman 2011). The 
increasingly popular phrase ‘privatizing profits, socializing risks’ comes to 
mind. It is pure ideology to suggest public banks are inherently more risky (or 
corrupt) than private banks (Lapavitsas 2010, 194). Rather, in the context of 
this global crisis, many state-owned banks have been more stable and far 
less risky. 
 
Myth Eight: State banks are bad for development 
In a recent review of the global financial sector the World Bank (2012a, 101) 
argues: “The empirical evidence largely suggests that government bank 
ownership is associated with lower levels of financial development and slower 
economic growth. Policy makers need to avoid the inefficiencies associated 
with government bank ownership.” This view seems to be upheld irrespective 
of the recent global failure of private banks, though some official revisionism 
on their potential benefits amidst systemic crisis has emerged (Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Servén 2010; cf. Bertay et al. 2014). 
 Outside neoliberal circles the “evidence that the prevalence of state 
ownership in the banking sector conspires against its ultimate development… 
appears to be weaker than suggested by previous studies” (Levy Yeyati et al. 
2007, 237-238). Case studies on India and Turkey, for example, both found 
that state-owned banks are the more efficient banks (Aysan and Ceyhan 
2010; Bhattacharyya et al. 1997; Kök and Ay 2013). More to the point, many 
of the highest growth emerging economies over the last decade have among 
the highest levels of state bank ownership (e.g. Brazil, Russia, India, China 
and Turkey). By contrast, the archetypes of modern liberalized private 
finance, the US and UK, have been mired in crises and economic stagnation. 
This is not to suggest that state-owned banks are a cure-all for economic 
woes but simply to dispel the myth that they necessarily lead to 
underdevelopment and therefore should be privatized with all possible haste. 
There are further reasons why state-owned banks may in fact be quite 
good for financing development. These include countercyclical lending at 
times of crisis; support for the public sector and public infrastructure; and 
serving as countervailing force against the power of global finance.  
 
Countercyclical lending 
	 14	
In times of crisis, private banks tend to withdraw lending to reduce risks and 
protect profits (deleveraging), thereby worsening the crisis. That is, private 
banks are pro-cyclical. By contrast, state-owned banks are able to and often 
do lend counter-cyclically during a crisis (Hawkins and Mihaljek 2001, 15). A 
recent empirical study of 764 major banks from 50 countries (wherein 63 were 
state-owned) finds that state-owned banks effectively compensate for private 
banks’ reticence to lend amidst crises (Brei and Schclarek 2013). Even the 
World Bank has had to begrudgingly accept this, as the private banks 
withdrew credits during the global financial crisis and the state-owned banks 
stepped in to offset the impact (World Bank 2012a, 102; Bertay et al 2014). A 
country’s state-owned banks can also facilitate counter-cyclical trends through 
their holdings of Treasury bonds (i.e. financing the government), which tend to 
be more stable than when the private sector holds public debts (von 
Mettenheim 2010, 51). This helps hold down public debt costs and extend the 
terms of lending. Even a Federal Reserve Bank of Boston report recognizes 
that, while not without complications, owning a state bank can be useful for 
public policy, especially when economic downturns, instability and budget 
shortfalls arise (Kodrzycki and Elmatad 2011, 18). That state-owned banks 
can effectively lend in difficult times has gone a long way to reviving support 
for them in development circles. 
 
Stable long-term support  
State banks have the advantage of being able to provide stable, long-term 
financing – without the immediate short-term profit imperatives that private, 
corporatized banks must face – by drawing the investment risks into the public 
sphere. As such, state-owned banks can provide longer-term credits to fund 
infrastructure and investment than private banks (as in the East Asian 
developmental state examples, see Erdogdu 2004). At the same time, state 
banks can provide a powerful fiscal advantage by making use of the fractional 
reserve system (i.e. lending over and above the actual cash reserves held by 
roughly 10 fold) (von Mettenheim 2010, 11; 21-22). Put otherwise, state-
owned banks can help realize public financing of development strategies at 10 
per cent of the fiscal cost compared to direct funding. A few examples can 
help to illustrate. 
The 100 per cent state-owned Banco de Costa Rica (BCR) is the most 
profitable of the country’s three state-owned banks (BCR 2011). The BCR 
mission statement is to promote “social development, competitiveness and 
sustainability by offering customers a public financing conglomerate with 
innovative and excellent services.” The BCR has an explicit social 
responsibility policy and actively funds projects of national economic interest. 
For example, its current projects include the Garabita Thermical for electricity 
generation, a hydroelectric station, and other large infrastructure projects. 
Together with the two other state-owned banks, the Banco Nacional de Costa 
Rica (BNCR) and the Banco Crédito Agrícola de Cartago (Bancrédito), they 
also offer a safe haven for domestic deposits and mobilize their domestic 
savings-based funding for the public good. In 2008 the government mobilized 
the state-owned banks towards more explicit developmental goals through the 
Law to Create a System of Banks for Development (No. 8634). The Law 
requires the state-owned banks to dedicate resources to a ‘mega fund’ for 
sustainable finance. Bancrédito is charged with administering this fund, which 
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collectively supports state fiscal and developmental policy. Development in 
this case is posed more in the public good and as part of a larger, stable 
economic trajectory. 
In the United States, much has been made since the 2008-09 crisis 
about the Bank of North Dakota (BND, established in 1919), the only US state 
with a public bank. The BND emerged in response to the monopoly power of 
large turn-of-the-century financial institutions in the US and was mandated to 
provide affordable credit for local farmers, ranchers and businesses 
(Kodrzycki and Elmatad 2011, 4-5; also see www.publicbankinginstitute.org). 
The BND continues to service these sectors, but it is also integrated into 
North Dakota’s public sector and provides certain services. The BND assets 
are backed by the state and authorities are required to deposit all public 
revenues in the bank. About two-thirds of the bank’s earnings, in turn, flow 
back into the state contributing about 0.75 per cent of revenue (Kodrzycki and 
Elmatad 2011, 9). The state’s legislature guides the BND on important budget 
decisions like salaries, employee numbers, major projects, and so on. The 
bank’s public orientation thus includes offering low-interest student loans, 
supporting public policy, and periodically helping to fund local governments by 
purchasing municipal bonds. The BND has even been mobilized to provide 
emergency support to the community in the aftermath of natural disasters (for 
example, during a flood in 1997). As the sub-prime crisis was unfolding in the 
US, the BND increased loans and offered letters of credit to local banks to 
support liquidity from 2007 to 2009 (Kodrzycki and Elmatad 2011, 4). In this 
case, the BND forms a stable financial bedrock that supports a range of 
economic services and protections that would be otherwise unavailable. 
In India the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development 
(NABARD, established in 1979) is a fully state-owned development bank 
mandated to facilitate credits for agricultural and rural development and to 
support related rural economic activities (World Bank 2012b). With assets of 
around $23 billion in 2009, the NABARD has also established a nationwide 
presence (28 regional offices). The NABARD has an intermediary role helping 
to finance other smaller lending institutions in rural areas while assuming a 
public regulatory role over client banks and other cooperative banks 
(www.nabard.org). The NABARD also supports public infrastructure 
investment and collaborates with other government agencies in the planning 
of rural development. Some of NABARD’s infrastructure projects since 2011 
include: managing the Rural Infrastructure Development Fund (which targets 
irrigation, rural roads and bridges, health and education, soil conservation, 
drinking water schemes, flood protection, and forest management projects); 
establishing the new Infrastructure Development Assistance credit program; 
and managing the Watershed Development Fund. NABARD provides these 
major initiatives with the long-term stable financing they require to push 
forward with developmental initiatives. The NABARB, of course, is far from 
perfect and, ironically (in neoliberal terms), its least progressive role has to do 
with its promotion of microfinance in India, which has been heavily criticised 
for its exploitative, poorly managed, and unrealistic developmental ambitions 
(Morgan and Olsen 2011). 
In Brazil the federal state-owned banks have helped to fund public 
policy as well. Lending to the federal government (excluding other state-
owned enterprises) reached more than BRL $8 billion as the global crisis 
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spread in 2008-09. Lending to state and municipal governments has averaged 
about R$10 billion per year since 2008 (von Mettenheim 2010, 34-37). 
Historically, the state-owned commercial bank, Caixa Economica, provided 
infrastructure support (water, sewer, transportation) for municipalities (von 
Mettenheim 2010, 128-130). The better known public development bank, 
Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (BNDES), is the 
federal government’s principal instrument for investment policy and the 
distribution of long-term financing (World Bank 2012b). As a development 
bank, it does not accept public deposits but draws resources from government 
pension funds and official savings funds. For this reason, BNDES has access 
to a low-cost funding base that in turn enables BNDES to offer below-market 
interest rates for agriculture, construction, industry, services, mining, 
infrastructure, energy, as well as to other SOEs (von Mettenheim 2014).  
In China, the state-owned banks are at the heart of financing 
infrastructure and development (debt from capital markets is comparatively 
small). As in many emerging economies, domestic deposits provide the chief 
source of bank capital (about 70 per cent of resources). The government 
finances development both directly and indirectly. For the direct funding of 
infrastructure, the China Development Bank (large projects) and the 
Agricultural Development Bank of China (agricultural and rural projects) have 
been especially important (CBRC 2010, 33; Chiu and Lewis 2006, 202). The 
China Development Bank, for example, provided the long-term capital for both 
the massive Three Gorges hydroelectric project and China’s new high-speed 
railway system (Martin 2012, 17). In 2010 alone it lent over $66 billion to 
develop coal, electricity, oil, telecommunications, transportation and public 
infrastructure. The China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) can also 
help direct credit regionally for development purposes. For example, in 2010 
the CBRC directed SOB resources to the western region of China to mitigate 
risks and promote development (CBRC 2010, 46). Authorities also employ 
indirect policy measures to finance development (Chiu and Lewis 2006, 203-
204). Indirect funding policy tools include managing the exchange rate, setting 
growth targets for the money supply, and using differential reserve 
requirement ratios (RRRs) to help channel funds into preferential sectors 
(Turner et al. 2012). The government uses these indirect mechanisms, among 
other reasons, to direct large credits towards the SOEs and state 
infrastructure projects. The fact that ownership and control remains largely in 
the hands of government authorities also means that these policy tools (direct 
and indirect) are more effective in their implementation and can be rolled out 
for the long term. To be sure, here (as in most banks, public and private) the 
lack of democratic accountability is a serious matter around which social 
forces need to act. 
 
Countervailing political force  
Political battles for control over a country’s money, financing, and debt have 
figured prominently in many struggles for national liberation, revolution and 
development. In the case of Portugal’s 1975 popular uprising, for example, 
the law legalizing bank nationalization was deemed the “most revolutionary 
law ever approved” against fascism (Noronha 2013). The nature and 
outcomes of such social struggles, of course, vary considerably. However, 
most share some collective goal of achieving greater domestic and popular 
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political autonomy by minimizing the power of private financial capital. Some 
of the most famous cases include the Russian, Chinese and Cuban 
revolutions (see, respectively, Lenin 1917; Chiu and Lewis 2006; Central 
Bank of Cuba at www.bc.gob.cu). Lesser known, but likewise inspired, 
struggles were seen in Costa Rica (1948) and Vietnam (see Brenes 1990; 
Spoor 1987). Such examples are not relegated to history, however. 
Venezuela offers a different portrait of a society actively seeking to 
craft an alternative banking system, albeit within the constraints of 
neoliberalism. In 2001 Venezuela created a new development bank, the 
Banco de Desarrollo Económico y Social de Venezuela (Bandes) to help 
finance public sector entities, support infrastructure building, and offer 
technical advice with the goal of creating more equitable regional 
development (World Bank 2012b). The government has also increased state-
owned commercial bank assets from under 12 per cent in 2008 to over 33 per 
cent in 2010. This began with the Hugo Chavez administration’s 
nationalization of the Bank of Venezuela on July 31, 2008. The political intent 
was to subordinate the bank’s operations to national developmental strategies 
and to strengthen the Bolivarian revolutionary process by bolstering domestic 
monetary capacity and the public financial sector, simultaneously weakening 
the power of foreign financial capital. Subsequently, a corruption scandal 
among private bankers in late 2008 led to the failure, liquidation and state 
takeover of eight other smaller banks. Four of these were merged into the 
state-owned Banco de Fomento Regional Los Andes (Banfoandes) to craft a 
new powerful public investment bank, the Banco Bicentenario (controlling 
about 20 per cent of deposits).2 The bank supports alternative productive 
processes and, in particular, more accessible housing credits. The state-
owned banks also fund the central government budgeting process by 
purchasing state bonds and, by institutionalized mandates, lend to the public 
sector. The Venezuelan example is significant because it illustrates the 
importance of political will for an alternative vision of development. Social and 
political forces understand the government’s move into banking as necessary 
to mitigate the power of financial capital in Venezuela and as a way to 
mobilize domestic resources for the Bolivarian social developmental process. 
This process is not without complications and contradictions, but the 
importance of gaining control over domestic monetary resources as a means 
of increasing national autonomy should not be underestimated. 
The newly minted New Development Bank, or so-called BRICS Bank, 
is the most recent political initiative to create a multilateral state-owned 
development bank by the member countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa). This move is perhaps unsurprising given these societies’ 
historic capacity with state banking and their controversial experiences with 
the IFIs. BRICS members ostensibly envision this new development bank as 
a potential counterforce the power of IFIs like the World Bank and foreign 
financial capital by supporting local infrastructure and sustainable 
development, trade and financial stability among developing economies. The 
formal Inter-Governmental Agreement to establish the NDB was signed in 
July at the Sixth BRICS Summit in Fortelaza, Brazil. The Agreement 
dedicated some $50 billion in start-up capital, which may increase to $100 																																																								
2 See http://www.bicentenariobu.com/index.php  
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billion. That developing countries can band together to press back against the 
neoliberal hegemony of the Bretton Woods institutions and advanced 
capitalisms is significant. Yet, as critical observers recognize, there is a 
pressing need to ensure the NDB remains beholden to the social 
development needs of the many, as opposed to corporate profitability 
imperatives in these countries, through processes of real democratization of 
banking and credit (Bond 2014). 
 
Conclusion 
Neoliberal mythology universally portrays state-owned banks as bad for 
development, unmediated by history, circumstance, or popular democratic 
aspirations. Privatization is sold as the only true improvement. But when this 
proves unworkable in reality, IFIs and neoliberal advocates push for market-
oriented restructuring in attempts to make state-owned banks operate as if 
they were private, profit-maximizing institutions. Both strategies have been 
successful in neoliberal terms, as state bank numbers have fallen and state-
owned banks have been corporatized. 
 Yet important state-owned banks remain in operation globally. Contrary 
to neoliberal mythology, there exists remarkable diversity as well, as each 
state bank is an institutional crystallization of historical and contemporary 
social relationships of political, economic, and class relationships of power. 
Understood in this way there are no necessarily good or bad state-owned 
banks. Individual state banks must be assessed according to criteria relevant 
and valid for each particular case, while accounting for overarching structural 
forces such as neoliberalism and global capitalism. By jettisoning the a priori 
and negative hypotheses of neoclassical economics we can recognize that 
there is much to commend in state-owned banks as potential and real 
progressive alternatives to privatization and neoliberalism. Not least among 
these reasons is because state banks, unlike private banks, can be potentially 
released from profit imperatives and directed to serve the public good – given 
the political will to do so. Saying this does not gloss over the problems state-
owned banks face, but it does suggest that societies can address such 
challenges democratically and with an open view to the role people and state 
institutions can play in determining the collective nature of finance. This is 
perhaps one of the most promising new research programmes today, in large 
part opened up by the ongoing impact of the 2008-09 global financial crisis.  
The stakes could not be higher. Unlike any other sector of the 
economy, banking and finance are key to all modern forms of development, 
capitalist or socialist. Non-private and democratized financial coordination 
capacity must figure prominently in the pursuit of any alternative social 
developmental strategy (for strategies of innovation and defence, see Marois 
and Güngen 2013). More to the point, there is no hope of creating a structural 
alternative to neoliberalism without first asserting democratic control over 
society’s money resources. At this particular conjuncture, democratized state-
owned banks offer the most viable alternative.
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